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Chapter 19
Habits and Autism: Restricted, Repetitive 
Patterns of Behaviour and Thinking 
in Autism
Ailsa Russell and Mark Brosnan
Leo Kanner, a child psychiatrist among the first to describe autism, noted in his 
observations of autistic children in 1973 that: ‘they had in common a combination 
of extreme aloneness from the beginning of life and an anxiously obsessive desire 
for the preservation of sameness. They were described by their parents as “living in 
a world of their own”; they were little routine addicts, living in a world in which 
nobody other than themselves was allowed to make any changes so far as their daily 
lives were concerned’.
Autism (also called Autism Spectrum Disorder, ASD, or Asperger syndrome) is 
a neurodevelopmental condition affecting around 1–2% of the population, and is 
present from the early years of life and affecting an individual across the lifespan. 
Autism is a pervasive neurodevelopmental disorder characterised by impairments in 
two domains: (1) Social communication and interaction; and (2) Restricted, repeti-
tive patterns of behaviour, interests or activities (American Psychiatric Association 
(APA), 2013). It has been included in modern classification systems for more than 
40 years (since DSM-III APA, 1987) and an expanding field of research has sought 
to understand this enigmatic condition. Although there are two clinical domains that 
characterise autism, less than 10% of research has taken the restricted, repetitive 
patterns of behaviour, interests or activities domain as its focus (Kasari & Lawton, 
2010), despite carers and professionals describing this as the most difficult set of 
symptoms to manage (Bishop et al., 2007; Lecavalier, Leone, & Wiltz, 2006; South, 
Ozonoff, & McMahon, 2005). One reason for the relative paucity of research into 
the behavioural and conceptual phenomena encompassed by the restricted, repeti-
tive patterns of behaviour, interests and activities domain is the absence of a theo-
retical framework to best understand their function and mechanisms. Extending the 
theoretical frameworks and empirical findings from research into behavioural and 
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mental habits offers an exciting opportunity to gain insights into the restricted, 
repetitive patterns of behaviour, interests and activities in autism. The present chap-
ter will consider the parallels between behavioural and mental habits with the 
restricted, repetitive patterns of behaviour, interests and activities which are a defin-
ing feature of autism. Firstly we will summarise what is known about the restricted, 
repetitive patterns of behaviour, interests and activities domain in autism (for a 
detailed review see Leekam, Prior, & Ulkarevic, 2011). We discuss ‘higher order’, 
compared to ‘lower order’, repetitive behaviours and how they are measured. 
Repetitive behaviours are then considered within their typical developmental trajec-
tory, focussing upon what their functions may be. Should repetitive behaviour 
become problematic, or pathological, we then consider interventions in addition to 
potential theoretical accounts, including the Executive Functioning and Dual 
Process theories of autism. Finally, we explore the automaticity that is argued to be 
a central component of habits (in addition to repetition) and the extent to which 
‘mental habits’ may facilitate a better understanding of ‘higher-order’ repetitive 
behaviours in autism.
 Classification and Taxonomy
Repetitive behaviour (RB) in the context of autism is a descriptive term used to 
denote behaviour which is repeated in an invariant manner, is topographically con-
sistent, and appears functionless in that its meaning is not immediately clear to the 
observer (Turner, 1999). The term encompasses a wide range of behavioural phe-
nomena from stereotyped motor behaviour such as rocking or self-biting to adher-
ence to a complex sequence of routines to a preoccupation with, and difficulty 
shifting, a pattern of thinking or belief system. Turner proposed two main categories 
or sub-types of RB, ‘lower order’ referring to stereotypies and sensory-motor 
behaviours and ‘higher order’, denoting repetition at a conceptual level such as a 
preference for routine. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual-5th Edition text revi-
sion (DSM-V, APA, 2013) requires that two of four categories or sub-divisions of 
restricted, repetitive patterns of behaviour, interests and activities are evidenced for 
this part of the diagnostic threshold for autism spectrum disorders (in addition to 
social communication deficits): (i) stereotyped motor movements, use of objects or 
speech, (ii) insistence on sameness, inflexible adherence to routines or ritualized 
patterns of verbal or nonverbal behaviour, (iii) highly restricted, fixated interests 
that are abnormal in intensity or focus and (iv) hyper- or hypo- reactivity to sensory 
input or unusual interests in sensory aspects of the environment. The sensory-motor 
aspects identified in the DSM-V (i) and (iv) criteria map onto Turner’s lower-order 
category of repetitive behaviour, whilst the conceptual aspects identified in the 
DSM-V (ii) and (iii) criteria map onto Turners higher-order category of repetitive 
behaviour. For the remainder of this chapter we will use the term ‘repetitive behav-
iours’ to refer to the full range of restricted, repetitive patterns of behaviour, inter-
ests and activities characteristic of autism. The term ‘lower order’ will be used to 
refer to sensory-motor repetitive behaviours such as repetitive finger movements or 
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stereotyped touching of preferred textures, and ‘higher order’ will be used to refer 
to behaviours reflecting conceptual repetition such as routinized activities or pursuit 
of intensely focused and circumscribed interests.
This lower-order and higher-order categorization of repetitive behaviours broadly 
corresponds to the sub-types of restricted repetitive behaviours enquired about in 
the most widely used diagnostic tool—the Autism Diagnostic Interview (ADI-R) 
(Lord, Rutter, & Le Couteur, 1994). A factor analytic study of the repetitive behav-
iour items on the ADI-R (Cuccaro, Shao, Grubber et al., 2003) established two dis-
tinct item groupings or factors. Factor I was termed repetitive sensory-motor 
behaviours (commensurate with lower-order repetitive behaviours) and Factor 2 
was termed a resistance to change/insistence on sameness (commensurate with 
higher-order repetitive behaviours). Five items loaded onto Factor I: Hand and fin-
ger mannerisms, unusual sensory interests, repetitive use of objects or parts of 
objects, Other complex mannerisms or stereotyped body movements; Rocking. 
Three items loaded onto Factor II: Difficulties with minor changes in routine or 
personal environment, Resistance to trivial changes in the environment; 
Compulsions/Rituals. In the Cuccaro et al. (2003) study of 207 children with autism, 
the lower-order and higher-order factors were not found to be correlated, leading the 
authors to conclude that they may represent relatively independent constructs (see 
also Harrop et  al., 2014). The behavioural phenomena encompassed by Factor 1 
(lower order) were negatively associated with adaptive functioning, suggesting that 
lower-order repetitive behaviours may be an index of general developmental delay. 
Lower-order repetitions have been found to occur as frequently in children with 
general developmental delay (Mooney, Gray, & Tonge, 2006; Richler, Bishop, 
Kleinke et al., 2007) and children with a number of genetic conditions (Moss et al., 
2009) as children with autism. Thus lower-order repetitions are not autism-specific 
and are attributable to developmental delay, intellectual disability and impaired 
language issues. Higher-order repetitions, on the other hand, are thought to be 
autism-specific.
Leekam, Prior, et al. (2011) review the methodological issues raised by this 
two factor classification. Importantly they highlight the potential for bi-directional 
relationships between lower-order and higher-order RBs. For example, a challenge 
to a higher-order insistence on sameness, may result in a lower-order rocking to and 
fro. In addition, repetitive verbal behaviour is not well dealt with by this two factor 
classification. Sometimes labelled ‘high level verbal stereotypies’, and frequently in 
the form of repetitive questions, these can be sophisticated in content and from the 
observer’s perspective, seemingly used strategically in social communicative situa-
tions. This introduces additional issues reflected by the debate in the literature about 
the independence of the social communication and repetitive behaviour domains in 
autism. Genetic studies situate some clear blue water between the traits in population- 
based studies (Ronald et al., 2006), which has led to the question ‘Is it time to give 
up on a single explanation of autism?’ (Happé et  al., 2006). Many theoretical 
accounts of autism have either focused upon the deficits in social communication 
OR the patterns of repetitive behaviour (see theory section below). However, clini-
cal epidemiological studies of autistic people are less confident, and the two domains 
of impairments, separable in measurement terms, are useful as a means of concep-
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tualizing aspects which contribute to the ‘autistic whole’. Furthermore, the neuro-
cognitive differences in autism present researchers with methodological issues in 
either eliciting first-person phenomenological accounts, or clearly delineating and 
isolating specified theoretical constructs in measurement methods.
 Measurement of Higher-Order and Lower-Order Repetitive 
Behaviours
The heterogeneity of repetitive phenomena in autism presents complexities in terms 
of developing well standardized measures that can be used across cultures and stud-
ies. The majority of studies have used parental/informant reports as a basis for mea-
surement with either broad categories of behaviour and example items employed as 
a structure, or questionnaires where behavioural phenomena are operationalised in 
terms of the parts of the body emphasized in the movements. Instruments which 
have been developed for use in research include the repetitive behaviours domain of 
the Autism Diagnostic Interview (ADI-R) (Lord, Rutter, & Le Couteur, 1994); the 
Childhood Routines Inventory (CRI; Evans et al., 1997); the Compulsive Behaviours 
Symptom Checklist of the Child version of the Yale Brown Obsessive Compulsive 
Scale (C-YBOCS), the Sameness Questionnaire (Prior & Macmillan, 1973), the 
Repetitive Behaviours Interview (RBI; Turner, 1999), the Repetitive Behaviour 
Scale (RBS-R; Bodfish, Symons, & Lewis, 1998) and Repetitive Behaviour Scale- 
Revised (RBS-R: Lam & Aman, 2007) and the Repetitive Behaviour Questionnaire 
(RBQ; Honey, McConachie, Turner, & Rodgers, 2012; Turner, 1995) and the RBQ-2 
(Leekam, Tandos, et al., 2007). A self-report version of the RBQ (RBQ-2A) (Barrett 
et al., 2015) is a standardised self-report measure for able young people and adults. 
Direct observation has also been used as part of the widely used semi-structured 
clinical assessment and research tool, the Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule 
(ADOS; Lord et al., 2000) and a small number of studies have used direct observa-
tion and time sampling methods within the framework of behavioural analysis to 
measure and investigate repetitive behaviours. Thus, research efforts have attempted 
to bring order to the heterogeneity of repetitive behaviours by investigating ques-
tions of phenomenological, conceptual, taxonomic, epidemiological and functional 
similarity at a group level across this diverse range of phenomena.
 Developmental Issues
Chronological age is an important factor when considering repetitive behaviour in 
autism in addition to developmental delay/level. Militerni, Bravavvio, Falco, Fico, 
and Palermo (2002) found that younger autistic children were more likely to show 
lower-order repetitive behaviours with older autistic children more likely to show 
higher-order repetitive behaviours. Lam and Aman (2007) found that while 
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self- injurious behaviour and compulsions were comparable across age groups in 
autism, stereotyped movements and restricted interests were less frequently 
observed, and ritualistic or sameness behaviour more frequently observed, in older 
age groups. In an attempt to further understand the role of intellectual impairment 
and age, Esbensen, Seltzer, Lam, and Bodfish (2009) combined data from a number 
of studies using the RBS-R to conduct a large (n = 712) cross-sectional analysis of 
repetitive behaviours. The sample ranged from 2 to 62 years of age and 62.2% had 
intellectual disability in addition to autism. The authors found that the adults in the 
study showed fewer of all types of repetitive behaviours as measured by the differ-
ent sub-scales of the RBS-R repeating the finding that increasing age is associated 
with decreasing repetitive behaviours. The age-related reduction was most marked 
for the restricted interests sub-scale. Again the authors established in their data set 
that intellectual disability was significantly associated with repetitive behaviour, in 
particular with lower-order repetitive behaviours and this domain showed a less 
pronounced reduction with age when intellectual disability was present. Bishop, 
Richler, and Lord (2006) also sought to understand the interaction between age, 
intellectual ability and restricted repetitive behaviours in a group of 830 children 
with autism. On this occasion the upper age limit was 12 years and non-verbal abili-
ties were taken as an index of cognitive function. The authors found that non-verbal 
ability was significantly negatively correlated with lower-order repetitive behav-
iours such as unusual sensory interests, hand and finger mannerisms, self-injury, 
repetitive use of objects and other complex mannerisms. However, higher-order 
repetitive behaviours such as circumscribed interests and compulsions and rituals 
were more commonly reported in children with higher non-verbal ability. Overall, 
therefore, these findings are consistent with the proposal that lower-order repetitive 
behaviours are associated with developmental delay and impaired cognitive ability 
generally, whereas higher-order repetitive behaviours are autism-specific and per-
sist into the later developmental period.
 ‘Normal’ and ‘Pathological’ Levels of Repetitive Behaviour
Repetitive behaviours are very much a part of typical development (Piaget, 1950), 
easily observed during the first year of infancy (Thelen, 1979) and declining after 
48 months (Evans et al., 1997). Repetitive behaviours are also common in healthy 
adults, where stereotypies or seemingly pointless, habitual repetitive movements 
are evident, particularly where an individual is bored or under stress (Asendorpf, 
1980; see also Chap. 9 in this volume). Repetition is an important aspect of almost 
all levels of behaviour across all species but can become pathological if there is 
excessive occurrence of a behavioural programme or, when there is a lack of self-
initiated, variable and novel behaviour. Pathological repetition can occur at many 
levels of function ranging from the observable excessive occurrence of simple 
motor acts (lower order) and difficulties at the conceptual or organizational level, 
perhaps in planning and strategy formation (higher order). Pathological repetitive 
behaviours have been observed across a number of clinical conditions including 
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Schizophrenia (Frith & Done, 1983), and Frontal Lobe Syndrome (Luria, 1973) 
amongst others. Although higher- order repetitive behaviours are more common in 
autistic people than typically developing people, it is not clear if they are truly 
‘pathological’ or an understandable, functional part of the autism picture. Research 
has sought to consider how repetitive behaviours in autism depart from the repeti-
tive behaviours observed in typical development. General population studies (e.g. 
Evans et al., 1997; Leekam, Tandos, et al., 2007) have found using standard mea-
surement tools that typically developing children between ages 2 and 3 years show 
a wide range of repetitive behaviours associated with autism. The break with typical 
development in autism is thus temporal rather than qualitative, at least in young 
children. The departure from typical development may be better understood as a 
failure to develop novel behaviours and hence repetitive behaviour continues with-
out cessation. This would seem to be the case for lower-order repetitive behaviours 
in those with intellectual disability and developmental delay (with or without 
autism) and for higher-order repetitive behaviours in those with autism.
Thus, repetitive behaviours are part of typical development in the early years. 
Lower-order repetitive behaviours appear to be associated with general develop-
mental delay once the peak of non-pathological repetition has passed at age 
48  months and may represent stimulus-driven rather than ‘willed’ behaviours. 
Within autism however, increasing age is associated with decreasing occurrence of 
lower-order repetitive behaviours, whilst higher-order repetitive behaviours seem to 
be more likely in autistic people of average intellectual ability (or above).
 Functions of Repetitive Behaviour
One avenue of research into repetitive behaviours has been to try and understand 
why they are being initiated, that is, their function. Recent research of repetitive 
behaviours in autism has proposed that repetition may serve to reduce chronically 
high anxiety levels in autism. Whilst anxiety is not a diagnostic characteristic of 
autism, anxiety occurs at clinically significant levels in around two thirds of autistic 
people (Simonoff et al., 2008). Rodgers et al. (2017) found a significant association 
between scores on the Repetitive Behaviour Questionnaire (RBQ), particularly the 
higher-order sub-scale and total scores on the Spence Children’s Anxiety Scale 
(SCAS) in a group of 67 young people with autism. Lidstone et al. (2014) similarly 
found that a significant association between RBQ-2 and anxiety scores reflected a 
significant correlation between the higher-order sub-scale and anxiety, but not the 
lower-order sub-scale. Neither study measured symptoms of Obsessive Compulsive 
Disorder (OCD), a potential confound with high rates of obsessive-compulsive 
symptoms reported in autistic people (McDougle et al., 1995; Russell et al., 2016). 
The issue of anxiety-based obsessive-compulsive symptoms represents a potential 
confound of some complexity when investigating repetitive behaviours in autism 
and has become a field of research in its own right (e.g. Zandt, Prior, & Kyrios, 
2007). As well as high rates of anxiety disorders, particularly social anxiety, high 
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rates of OCD have been reported across the lifespan in autism (Zandt et al., 2007). 
OCD comprises repeated, unwanted, intrusive thoughts associated with distress and 
compulsions, actions which an individual feels compelled to perform, often in 
response to obsessions. Heavily reliant on self-report, obsessive-compulsive symp-
toms in less verbally able children and adults with autism can be difficult to disen-
tangle from some forms of repetitive behaviours. Nonetheless, there is vast empirical 
evidence demonstrating the role of anxiety in the development and maintenance of 
OCD and consequently studies considering the function of repetitive behaviours in 
autism need to be mindful of anxiety-based obsessive-compulsive symptoms.
 Interventions for Repetitive Behaviours
Despite the prominence of repetitive behaviours in autistic children (and adults) and 
the associated management challenges for parents, care-givers and service provid-
ers (Bishop et al., 2007; Lecavalier et al., 2006; South et al., 2005), repetitive behav-
iours are rarely targeted for intervention and no standardized recommendations for 
treatment exist (see Boyd, McDonough, & Bodfish, 2012; Leekam, Prior, et  al., 
2011 for reviews). One of the reasons repetitive behaviours can be ‘treatment resis-
tant’ is a failure to consider WHY the autistic person is engaging in repetitive 
behaviours, i.e. considering their function (Leekam, Prior, et al., 2011). Militerni 
et al. (2002) in a study aiming to understand the function of, or environmental fac-
tors associated with, repetitive behaviours in a relatively large sample of young 
autistic children (n = 121) used a combination of parental report and direct clinic 
observation. The authors found that simple, motor sequences seemed to be rela-
tively purposeless and consistent with behaviours observed in typical development, 
while sensory-based behaviours presented as highly reactive, either to environmen-
tal or internal cues. Also carefully delineating repetitive phenomena according to 
behavioural topography may not be ideal. In operant accounts, very different behav-
iours can share the same functional class. Conversely a single behaviour can have 
many different functions. Of note, the authors could identify no studies where able 
young people and adults’ accounts of why they do what they do have been subject 
to systematic enquiry.
Thus whilst repetitive behaviour may be perceived to be the most challenging 
aspect of autism for parents/carers, this may not be the case for autistic individuals 
themselves. If the function of a higher-order repetitive behaviour is to reduce anxi-
ety, intervening to disrupt the higher-order repetitive behaviour may have adverse 
impact upon anxiety levels in the autistic individual. Within the literature on chal-
lenging behaviour (generally, not repetitive behaviour specifically), again research 
has highlighted how identifying the function of the behaviour that is perceived to be 
challenging is crucial for successful intervention. Challenging behaviour is a 
descriptive term for ‘culturally abnormal behaviour of such an intensity, frequency 
or duration, that the physical safety of the person or others is placed in serious 
jeopardy or behaviour which is likely to seriously limit the use of, or result in the 
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person being denied access to ordinary community facilities’ (Emerson, 2000). 
Challenging behaviour can be understood within operant learning theory as pur-
poseful behaviour, a means by which a person with compromised resources seeks to 
exercise some choice and control over their environment. Hence it is a form of 
behaviour which is shaped and maintained by environmental events. Challenging 
behaviour functions to access a desired event or avoid an undesired event, with 
reinforcement processes highlighted by the contingent relationship between behav-
iour and antecedent factors, and/or consequences. A commonly used assessment 
tool, the Motivation Assessment Scale (MAS: Durand & Crimmins, 1992) ascribes 
four main functional categories to a target behaviour, namely: sensory motivated 
behaviours, demand-escape, access to attention, and access to tangible resources. 
Functional analysis is a highly individualised process, and behaviours which are 
topographically similar across individuals may fulfil very different functions, with 
the converse also holding true. There is no reason to suppose that repetitive behav-
iours can be ascribed the same function across all autistic people but it is plausible 
that there may be formulations which are common to numbers of people with 
autism. For example, insisting on a highly routinized performance of an activity 
such as taking the same route to school each day may function to avoid the anxiety 
emerging from uncertain interactions or events on a novel route. Alternatively, it 
may be that the preferred route provides access to objects of intense interest or plea-
sure. Alternatively, repetitive behaviours may function to reduce access to unwanted 
social attention and communication by facilitating disengagement from interper-
sonal situations, they may be a source of internal stimulation or a means of escape 
from or coping with a demanding sensory environment.
 Theory
Much theoretical work on autism has focussed upon the social communication defi-
cits or an attention to local detail at the cost of global details (e.g. Baron-Cohen, 
Leslie, & Frith, 1985; Happé & Frith, 2006). The Theory of Mind account of autism, 
for example, proposes relative impairments in the ability to make inferences about 
mental states such as the thoughts, beliefs and intentions of others. Theory of Mind 
abilities are assumed to extend intra- as well as inter-personally. It is assumed that 
difficulties making inferences about the mental states of others are accompanied by 
similar difficulties in reasoning about one’s own mental state. Whilst not explicitly 
addressing repetitive behaviours, Theory of Mind may be pertinent as Williams and 
Happé (2010) attribute impairments in self-Theory of Mind (or ‘metacognition’) in 
autism in an inability to distinguish reflex behaviour from intended behaviour. When 
eliciting the classic knee-jerk reflex by tapping the knee with a hammer, autistic peo-
ple were more likely to report that they had intended to jerk their leg. There was an 
apparent deficit in distinguishing one’s intention between automatic and non-auto-
matic behaviours (see also Brosnan, Johnson, et al., 2016; Maras, Gamble, & Brosnan, 
2017). As noted above, deficits in metacognition can also impact upon researchers’ 
capacity to ask autistic people why they engage in repetitive behaviours.
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There are two theoretical accounts of autism that may relate more directly to 
repetitive behaviours, although evidence is mixed. The first is the Executive Function 
(EF) theory of autism. EFs refers to the neuropsychological processes critical to 
goal-directed, future-oriented behaviour, thought to be under the control of the fron-
tal regions of the brain and described by Shallice and Burgess (1991) as the abilities 
involved in planning and strategy formation, flexibility, inhibition of pre-potent 
responses and generation of novel responses. Studies have identified impairments in 
the majority of these functions in autism and a recent meta-analysis concluded an 
effect of overall impairment in EF in autism, with little evidence for a selective 
impairment in terms of fractionation of EF (Demetriou et al., 2018). There has been 
research investigating the relationship between facets of EF and repetitive behav-
iours. For example, Turner (1999) found a significant association between scores on 
Use of Objects, Ideational and Design Fluency (generativity tasks) and repetitive 
behaviours. Conversely, Lopez, Lincoln, Ozonoff, and Lai (2005) found that it was 
cognitive flexibility which had a unique contribution to repetitive behaviour scores 
not planning and generativity. Other researchers have found no association between 
EF deficits and repetitive behaviours (e.g. Boyd, McBee, Holtzclaw, Baranek, & 
Bodfish, 2009; Dichter, Lam, Turner-Brown, Holtzclaw, & Bodfish, 2009; Zandt, 
Prior, & Kyrios, 2009). Thus whilst perseveration associated with EF deficits may 
have an intuitive appeal for an account of the maintenance of higher-order repetitive 
behaviours in autism, evidence is far from consistent.
The second theory of autism that may be relevant to repetitive behaviours is the 
Dual Process Theory of Autism (Brosnan & Ashwin, 2018; Brosnan, Ashwin, & 
Lewton, 2017; Brosnan, Lewton, & Ashwin, 2016). Within Dual Process Theory 
(Evans & Stanovich, 2013), the dual processes are Type 1 processing, which is pre-
conscious, automatic and rapid, and Type 2 processing, which is conscious, delibera-
tive and slow. Typically, people engage in Type 1 processing unless overridden by 
Type 2 processing. The Dual Process Theory of Autism proposes that autism is char-
acterised by a dominance of Type 2 processing over Type 1 processing. Through a 
range of tasks, autistic people consistently demonstrate Type 2 behaviour in situa-
tions where Typically Developing people demonstrate Type 1 behaviour. Typically 
people can be encouraged to engage in Type 2 behaviour and over-ride their pre- 
potent Type 1 response (for example by being told to reflect upon a situation and 
write down why they are responding in a certain way). It is unknown whether autistic 
people are over-riding Type 1 processing with dominant Type 2 processing or whether 
Type 1 processing is impaired (or absent). Under this framework, it is the intuitive 
‘automatic’ aspects of Theory of Mind (see above) in rapid dynamic real world situ-
ations that pose difficulties for many autistic people. Many social communication 
deficits are seen as deficits in automatic processing. There can also be many strengths 
associated with autism, such as great attention to detail or a  preference for logical, 
systematic thinking which is consistent with a preference for Type 2 processing.
One advantage of Type 2 processing is that it supports the capacity to make 
effective predictions and minimise prediction error (see Baron-Cohen, Ashwin, 
Ashwin, Tavassoli, & Chakrabarti, 2009). Making prediction errors correlates with 
higher levels of anxiety in autistic people (Garfinkel et al., 2016), and engaging in 
Type 2 processing may relate to a strategic attempt to minimise prediction errors 
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and anxiety. However this is only effective in contexts that allow the time required 
to engage in Type 2 processing. Social situations are typically very rapid and draw 
upon automatic Type 1 processing to be effective. There is good evidence that autis-
tic people engage in Type 2 processing in contexts in which typically people engage 
in Type 1 processing (such as social contexts) which is extremely effortful and often 
unsuccessful in real world situations (see Harms, Martin, & Wallace, 2010). 
Speculatively, engaging in repetitive behaviours may be a mechanism by which 
novelty is minimised and prediction errors are minimised. This theorises a potential 
relationship between Type 2 processing and repetitive behaviours which may be 
more pertinent for higher-order cognition and consequently the autism-specific 
higher-order repetitive behaviours. Within the Dual Process Theory of higher-order 
cognition (Evans & Stanovich, 2013), there are multiple Type 1 systems of different 
kinds, including habitual forms of processing. A greater understanding of habits 
will therefore inform a more detailed understanding of repetitive behaviours in 
autism, specifically higher-order repetitive behaviours.
 Habits
Verplanken’s habit research has focussed upon the function of the habit (Verplanken 
& Orbell, 2003) and may therefore be particularly pertinent for better understanding 
restricted behaviours in autism. A habit can be defined as behaviour contextually 
cued, without conscious thought, via activation of a mental context-behaviour asso-
ciation learned through context-consistent performances (see Gardner, 2015). 
Definitions vary as to whether a habit is defined as a type of behaviour or as a type 
of automaticity—that is a cognitive mechanism independent of behaviour 
(Verplanken & Wood, 2006; Wood & Neal, 2009; see also Chap. 2 in this volume). 
Gardner (2015, p. 280) proposes that such definitional differences can be resolved 
by viewing habit as ‘a process by which a stimulus automatically generates an 
impulse towards action, based on learned stimulus-response associations’. Also per-
tinent from Verplanken’s (Verplanken, 2006; Verplanken, Friborg, Wang, Trafimow, 
& Woolf, 2007; see also Chap. 15 in this volume) research is the proposal of ‘mental 
habits’ that may be a useful framework for considering the autism-specific higher-
order repetitive behaviours. Mental habits are considered in terms of mental process 
distinguished from mental content. Verplanken et  al. (2007) propose that mental 
habits are unintended, are initiated without awareness, are difficult to control and 
are distinct from rumination and mindfulness. The authors focussed upon a ‘nega-
tive self-thinking habit’ that predicted anxiety symptoms 9 months later (in addition 
to other factors). This framework invites the initial question as to the extent to which 
higher-order repetitive behaviours in autism are unintended, initiated without aware-
ness and difficult to control.
Thus Verplanken et al. argue that although a history of repetition is part of the 
habit concept, repetition alone is not enough to qualify a behaviour as habit. 
Repetitive behaviours in autism are present from early childhood, and thus by defi-
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nition autistic repetitive behaviour has a history of repetition. Verplanken & Orbell 
(2003) argue that most conceptual definitions of habit contain other elements in 
addition to behavioural frequency, most notably the qualification of habit as behav-
iour that has acquired a certain degree of automaticity. Within this view, automatic-
ity may be broken down into four features: (1) lack of awareness; (2) mental 
efficiency; (3) lack of control; and (4) lack of conscious intent (the ‘four horsemen 
of automaticity’). The presence or absence of each of these features yields a variety 
of variants of automaticity. So, what pattern of automaticity characterises repetitive 
behaviour in autism (or how autistic are the four horsemen of automaticity)?
 A Lack of Awareness
Autism has been associated with impairments in metacognition, which can manifest 
as a lack of self-awareness. Difficulties interpreting your own feelings and inten-
tions (see Theory of Mind, above) may relate to a lack of awareness of repetitive 
behaviours. The extent to which an autistic person is aware they are engaging in 
repetitive behaviours may be a feature of whether lower-order or higher-order 
behaviours are being considered as well as the function of the repetitive behaviour. 
Systematic studies of first-person introspective accounts on this aspect are few and 
far between and thus the extent to which autistic people are aware of their autism- 
specific higher-order repetitive behaviour remains an unanswered question.
 Being Mentally Efficient
We have observed in this chapter, that autistic people may be reliant on Type 2, 
effortful processing and this may be particularly true in respect of social stimuli. An 
effortful processing style may be associated with an enhanced need for mental effi-
ciency at other times, perhaps in the form of cognitive ‘down-time’. It seems plau-
sible that repetitive mental and behavioural acts may counter-balance the periods of 
effortful processing by providing periods of efficient, predictable and more auto-
matic processing. Thus repetitive behaviours in autism may provide us with a win-
dow into the optimal balance of effortful versus automatic processing required by 
humans to manage limited information processing capacity.
 Sometimes Difficult to Control
Autistic people can have a focused interest on a particular topic which can be enjoy-
able and stimulating. However, these interests can also significantly interfere with 
everyday functioning (Mercier, Mottron, & Belleville, 2000), which may be some 
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indication that this focused interest mentally and behaviourally is not be entirely 
under an individual’s control. Mercier et al. found that autistic adults reported that 
restricted interests played a significant role in their lives that was acknowledged by 
most of their relatives. They provided a sense of well-being, a positive way of occu-
pying one’s time, a source of personal validation, and an incentive for personal 
growth. However, these positive dimensions were counterbalanced by their negative 
consequences, resulting in active processes to adapt, reduce or diversify their 
restricted interests.
 A Lack of Conscious Intent
Lower-order repetitive behaviour is more likely to be stimulus-bound, a rapid 
response to internal (e.g. anxiety) or external (e.g. environmental opportunity) cues 
and thus lacking in conscious intent. Whether higher-order autistic repetitive behav-
iours are associated with a lack of conscious intent presents an interesting question. 
Behaviours which are engaged in pursuit of a circumscribed interest e.g. seeking out 
items of interest or mentally listing all the preferred characters in a film will require 
conscious intent. Whether the preference for a restricted range of interests and activ-
ities is consciously intended or part of a neurobiological constitution is less certain. 
Thus, if autism is characterised by a restricted range of mental habits (repetitive 
thinking), the restriction may be without conscious intent, whereas the repetition 
may be with conscious intent.
Considering the four horsemen of automaticity from the habit literature may 
therefore be informative for understanding repetitive behaviour in autism, specifi-
cally how the automaticity of mental habits may relate to higher-order, autism- 
specific repetitive behaviours. Firstly, a history of repetition is a defining feature of 
autism. The level of awareness and conscious intent is an interesting area as it seems 
likely that an autistic person with a circumscribed interest will be aware of this 
interest or will be aware that they have a preferred route for going home from school 
(for example). It also seems likely that this would be accompanied by a conscious 
intent to talk about their circumscribed interest or to adhere to their routine. This 
may be rewarding in itself as well as anxiety reducing and potentially difficult to 
control. However, it may be that the autistic person is not motivated to control the 
repetitive behaviour, whereas family members may be motivated to try and do so. 
Many of the interventions to address repetitive behaviours address ‘challenging 
repetitive behaviours’, which are typically challenging to the family (and may have 
a function for the autistic individual). Being mentally efficient also raises interesting 
questions. Dual Process Theory proposes that habitual thinking is an automatic 
Type 1 process, however the Dual Process Theory of Autism proposes a bias away 
from automatic Type 1 processing.
Thus habits and repetitive behaviours may share a history of repetition, but may 
be distinguished from each other in terms of automaticity. The presence or absence 
of each of the ‘four horsemen of automaticity’ is argued within the mental habits 
literature to yield ‘a variety of variants of automaticity’. It is an intriguing hypoth-
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esis that mental habits might represent automatic Type 1 processing whereas autistic 
higher-order repetitive behaviours might represent automatic Type 2 processing. It 
would be fascinating if effortful processing was the default in autism, that is ‘auto-
matic’ in the sense that it is not initiated after Type 1 processing. Within this frame-
work we could speculate that a drive for repetition minimises cognitive resources 
(e.g. humans being ‘cognitive misers’), which is  typically achieved through the 
automaticity of (Type 1) mental habits. However,  higher-order repetative behav-
iours may emerge in autism as a response to a drive for repetition combined with a 
bias away from the automaticity of Type 1 processing - a distinction which could be 
assessed emprically. The mechanisms by which habits develop (shift from Type 2 to 
Type 1 processing?) may therefore provide an interesting perspective. Might repeti-
tive behaviour arise from this shift not occurring in autism? The findings that mental 
habits and repetitive behaviours are both related to levels of anxiety may also sug-
gest a common function. This can have important implications for how (or if) inter-
vention may impact upon repetitive behaviour. Can the literature on habit change 
inform interventions for repetitive behaviour in autism?
 Framework for Habit Change
Habit change typically seeks to understand the context, the cue and the reward for 
the habitual routine. For example, Duhigg (2013), evokes three core components of 
habits; the routine, the cue and the reward. The framework for changing habits 
therefore is based upon these three components:
 Identify the Routine
This concerns the repetitive behaviour you want to change and is typically easily 
identifiable, such as an insistence on sameness or routine that is problematic (noting 
this may be problematic for the family rather than the autistic person).
 Experiment with Rewards
Our earlier discussions considering the possible functions of repetitive behaviour in 
autism showcase the potential for repetitive behaviours as coping strategies for a 
range of hypothesised stressors, such as managing chronically high anxiety levels, as 
a source of stimulation and pleasure when social interaction is experienced as aver-
sive. In this context, repetitive behaviour may provide activity and structure which 
require less effort and thereby minimise cognitive load (and are predictable). 
Repetitive behaviours are at the very core of autism, and an intricate relationship 
between repetitive behaviour and social communication impairments is likely to 
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exist. There is a diagnosis of Social (Pragmatic) Communication Disorder for chil-
dren who have social communication and interaction difficulties without repetitive 
behaviours. There are instances when repetitive behaviours can meet the definition 
of challenging behaviour and change is desirable for an individual’s well-being and 
quality of life (for example repetitive damaging self-injurious behaviour, or engage-
ment in a circumscribed interest to the exclusion of essential activities of daily liv-
ing). At a more general level however, introducing change to the ‘habit of repetitive 
behaviour’ may not be an ethical or desired outcome. The ‘reward’ for repetitive 
behaviour in autism may well be more effective coping with the world. Alternative 
coping strategies will be required and may not be as easy to institute or as effective.
 Isolate the Cue
Once again, if anxiety were the cue, biofeedback systems could serve as a mecha-
nism to isolate the cues for repetitive behaviours. Once isolated, the cue ideally is 
removed from the environment. Anxiety is a sense of apprehension and is closely 
related to fear. It has physiological, emotional and cognitive facets and typically 
occurs in response to specific triggers. In the context of autism, these are often fac-
tors such as uncertainty about change, unpredictability, social interaction etc. 
Removing the cue by making the world a more predictable and less social place to 
live is inherently impractical.
If we continue with our route home example, let’s suppose road works mean you 
have to alter your route home as you drive your child back from school. If the child 
starts to rock to and fro, the cue may be the internal detection of raising anxiety 
levels and the reward may be the alleviation of the feeling of anxiety. The context of 
such an explanation is crucial. The raised anxiety might be induced by an unex-
pected change in the environment and this lack of predictability of such change 
culminated in a repetitive behaviour which is predictable and thereby reduces feel-
ings of anxiety. In this hypothetical example, the cue to the repetitive behaviour 
could be the detection of unexpected change or the sense of increasing anxiety. The 
reward could be the re-establishment of the prediction (i.e. the usual route home, not 
possible in this example) or a reduction in anxiety. Preventing the child engaging in 
the repetitive behaviour may therefore be denying them access to their only form of 
anxiety management. Thus the context of the repetitive behaviour—predictability 
or anxiety—may be crucial to understand in terms of cues and rewards. Indeed, 
most likely both of these aspects come into the equation. It is also possible that there 
are circumstances where separating the context, the cue and the reward is not pos-
sible. In cases where the behaviour is rewarding in and of itself. Sensory-motor 
repetitions can fit this bill, and will occur across contexts, independent of cues and 
automatically reinforcing.
We are left with some important questions following our attempt to map repeti-
tive behaviours in the geography of the habit landscape. These include:
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Can the different dimensions of automaticity be operationalised and reliably mea-
sured to investigate the relevance for repetitive behaviours in autism (Type 1 vs. 
Type 2 processing from Dual Process Theory).
How viable is a distinction between higher-order vs. lower-order repetitive behav-
iours, mental vs. behavioural habits. Is there a different way to conceptualise the 
heterogeneity of repetitive phenomena e.g. in terms of functional class or 
automaticity.
What is the function of higher-order repetitive behaviours or mental habits? To what 
extent are they anxiety management strategies?
How does the restriction in the range of behaviours, interests and activities in autism 
relate to repetition?
Finally, as we note above much of the motivation for repetitive behaviour 
research within autism has been to perceived negative (challenging) consequences. 
A focus upon the positive consequences may enable a better understanding of 
‘adaptive repetitive behaviours’ rather than ‘pathological habits’.
Habit Research in Action
Behavioural repetition is relatively easy to observe, and studies have relied on 
informant reports. Less accessible to measurement is mental repetition. 
Typically, investigation of habitual thinking is a matter of retrospective and 
reflective self-report. The validity of this method in autism is under question 
due to impairments in metacognition (Brosnan, Johnson, et al., 2016; Maras 
et al., 2017; Williams & Happé, 2010), introspective abilities and recognition 
of one’s own emotional state. Descriptive experience sampling methodology 
(DESM) is a means of ‘catching’ internal phenomena in the moment before it 
is mapped or subject to heuristic processing. DESM was pioneered by 
Hurlburt, (1993, 1997; Hurlburt & Heavey, 2006) and was successfully used 
in a small study of adults with autism (Hurlburt, Happé, & Frith, 1994), which 
found that autistic people’s thinking might be represented visually rather than 
verbally. We have adapted the DES method to address questions about mental 
repetition, specifically restricted and repetitive thinking in autism, using a 
structured booklet with prompt questions, space for pictures and use of a 
smartphone application to aid data collection (Cooper, Russell, Calley, & 
Verplanken, in preparation). Inductive content analysis of the mental repeti-
tion reported by able adults with autism and compared to typically developing 
adults will answer two simple questions: Do adults with autism have restricted 
categories or types of thoughts compared to non-autistic adults, and are these 
categories or types of thought repeated more frequently? Participant ratings of 
the positive or negative experience of repetitive thoughts will afford some 
limited insight into the nature of restricted and repetitive mental experience of 
autism.
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